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Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics of Identity. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2004, 384p. ISBN 0-691-12036-6, $29.95 
Kwame Anthony Appiah is an unapologetic liberal individualist, and in this new 
book aims to lay the groundwork for a new version of liberal theory adequate to 
the challenges of our time. Liberalism, Appiah states, is an evolving tradition of 
concerns for certain values (e.g., limited government and basic rights, equality, 
autonomy, dignity, tolerance and individuality) as well as concerns for arguments 
about their meanings, justifications, and proper applications. Succeeding genera-
tions of liberals have made important contributions—Locke on limited govern-
ment, Kant on autonomy, the French revolutionists on equality, Mill on indi-
viduality. Combining, but also critiquing, the elements that constitute their 
common heritage, liberals reconstruct liberal theory to protect and advance their 
values in the unique conditions of their own times. Appiah’s attempt to recon-
struct liberalism calls to mind John Dewey’s project a century earlier.  
The word “identity” in his title gives a broad hint about how Appiah sees 
current challenges. Liberal ethics and politics have tended to make use of a par-
ticular abstraction: the rational, autonomous, individual self. They have inquired 
about the rights and obligations this thinly conceived self possesses, and the chal-
lenges it faces in realizing its individual potential. Liberals have not denied that 
actually existing people are more than the “thin” individuals of liberal theory, 
that they are “encumbered” with various ethnic, religious, professional, and 
community identities that are replete with special obligations and value com-
mitments. But until recently liberals have not attended to how recognition of 
such identities might qualify the received wisdom of liberal theory.  
Issues of identity have, however, forced themselves upon the public atten-
tion in recent years, due to the civil rights movement, the influx of immigrants, 
and the re-emergence of religion in civic life. Claims regarding identity have, as a 
result, have generated a large body of scholarly literature, much of which has 
been devoted to showing how attention to identity undermines not only received 
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liberal notions of rationality, autonomy, and individuality, but liberalism itself. 
Appiah sets out to assess this challenge, by scrutinizing the concept of “identity” 
and the various notions associated with it such as “culture” and “diversity.” 
As identity claims have come to the fore, Appiah notes, philosophers have 
become increasingly aware that narrowly moral obligations make up only a small 
part of our normative concerns; special obligations associated with the group at-
tachments we form in the course of shaping our lives also play an important role. 
While there is today no settled way of marking out the normative sphere focused 
on the kinds of lives that are good or bad for a person to lead, this issue was cen-
tral to what the ancient philosophers marked as “ethics,” and he chooses to 
adopt their language. Thus, an “ethics of identity” is a normative theory about 
how identities enter, for good or for ill, into the kinds of lives we lead. 
Appiah writes not as a social prognosticator or guide, but as a professional 
philosopher situated squarely within contemporary philosophical discourse. Act-
ing as adjudicator, he groups philosophical concepts and arguments together for 
assessment under broad topics like autonomy, identity, and culture. As an inter-
esting stylistic gesture, Appiah invites John Stuart Mill, a prophet of liberal indi-
vidualism, to accompany him as he moves through this terrain. Mill’s familiar 
texts provide Appiah with concrete ideas both to consider and to test against 
current philosophical ideas. This is a nice touch, because Mill’s focus on the 
challenges of attaining individuality in the face of pressures to conform to social 
conventions plays nicely against the potential constraints imposed by socially 
given identities. Does it help, or hurt, people to attain a full measure of individu-
ality, Appiah asks, when their given identities (as Jews or African American, or 
for that matter, as professional philosophers) already encumber them with pre-
scribed life scripts, values, and obligations? 
Alan Ryan has suggested that Dewey might have been a more suitable 
companion for Appiah, as Dewey took up many of the issues that Appiah con-
siders along the way. Given Appiah’s individualist starting point, I think that 
Mill is the wiser choice, because, like William James but, arguably, unlike Dewey, 
Mill had a very special place in his heart for all manner of distinct, even eccen-
tric, individuals. Though he was no romantic individualist who imagined an au-
thentic self to be stamped upon each person at conception, he recognized that 
given the great diversity of genetic endowments and early life circumstances, an 
equally wide diversity of kinds of lives were required for individuals to flourish.  
The Ethics of Identity is divided into six chapters, backed up by endnotes 
constituting almost one fifth of the text. Although the theory of “rooted cos-
mopolitanism” presented in the final chapter recapitulates many of Appiah’s 
themes, the book is not in fact structured as a unified argument for a compre-
hensive new theory, but rather as a series of detailed assessments of concepts and 
arguments. In what follows I selectively present some of the main ideas of the 
book, and then offer a brief overall assessment.  
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Chapter 1, “The Ethics of Individuality,” asks how the notion of identity 
enters into the liberal conception of individuality. The attainment of individual-
ity is a central concern of liberal ethics. It is not a given, as postulated by roman-
tic conceptions of authenticity (being true to your authentic self) but develops in 
coordination with a plan of life (a notion central to the ethical theories of Mill, 
Royce and Rawls). Life plans are not like engineering plans that lay out determi-
nate, concrete steps for realizing fully imagined designs. Rather, they are basic 
life projects and commitments, mutable sets of articulating aims that are expres-
sions of each person’s evolving individuality and that provide something like a 
rudder as that person steers through the contingencies of life.  
For a liberal, this plan is “up to” each person; each is responsible for giving 
life a definite shape. But the plan is not, therefore, arbitrary; it is not a good plan 
merely because a person has made it, but rather because it is chosen in light of 
realistic consideration of his or her dispositions, circumstances, and life options. 
Because this life plan makes essential reference to existing circumstances and 
available life options, however, it is inevitably social; it is mapped out through 
concepts and practices available in the surrounding society. On such a view, the 
individual whose self-creation is valued is not the narrowly self-regarding indi-
vidualist, a point Dewey frequently insisted upon. 
Society for its part already provides a repertoire of kinds of lives, and vari-
ous narrative scripts for them, associated with loose norms and models deter-
mining what living these kinds of lives entails. These are social identities. Such 
identities assist each of us in making choices among valuable things that, without 
our identities, we would have no basis in choosing. They provide patterns which 
help us focus on particular issues, form solidarity with others sharing our iden-
tity, and see where we stand in the social whole. A person who identified as a 
Jew, for example, would have, by virtue of that identity, a basis for choosing 
among foods, for taking a special interest in the historical plight of the Jewish 
people, for a feeling of solidarity with other Jews, and for situating himself as 
something of an outsider in a social world that is dominantly Christian. In this 
way social identities can be thought of as pre-existing basic life plans, scripts that 
their bearers live out over the course of their lives. Individuality consists in ac-
cepting (or resisting) those identities that are thrust upon one (e.g. racial, reli-
gious and gender identities), choosing others (e.g., professional or residential 
identities), and then modifying them to suit one’s particular dispositions and 
circumstances. Here Appiah may be asked whether identities play a necessary 
mediating role in the development of individuality. A young man attracted to 
wilderness and offended by the encroachments of developers might today em-
brace an “environmentalist” identity that has Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, 
and Aldo Leopold baked in as models. But did these models have comparable 
social identities available for them, or were they in some important sense “true 
originals”? 
Chapter 2, “Autonomy and Its Critics,” is concerned with the meaning of 
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liberal autonomy and its place in ethical and political life, focusing on the ten-
sion between liberal concern for rational self-direction and recognition of the so-
cial matrix of identities that not only constrains, but also constitutes individual 
selves.  
Some philosophers conceive autonomy as an ethical virtue that demands 
cultivation. For them, autonomy consists in the full and free rational delibera-
tion regarding actions and choices. On that view of autonomy few individuals 
actually are autonomous, as few are sufficiently rational and deliberative. Appiah 
rejects this strong account of autonomy, arguing that it requires a level of critical 
self-consciousness not entailed by the concept. One can be an autonomous per-
son, he quips, without becoming a moral philosopher. Other philosophers, most 
notably the communitarians, claim that the very idea of an autonomous individ-
ual is strictly incoherent; individuals are constituted within a social context: 
selves are functions in a social field and their choices are bound up with the life 
scripts of subject positions.  
Each of these two groups, according to Appiah, adopts one of two distinct 
perspectives on the individual in society: a subject-centered perspective that fo-
cuses on agency vs. a social-centered perspective that focuses on existing social 
structure. The mistake lies in placing these perspectives in opposition. The two 
perspectives are conceptual tools that serve different interests; they bring differ-
ent factors into focus and provide different vocabularies for talking about what 
we see. Different situations call for the use of different perspectives and their vo-
cabularies. The importance of the agency perspective with its discourse of auton-
omy is that it enables us to conceive of a political sphere in which persons are re-
garded as ends, as possessing dignity and inherent worth, that is, a social and 
political order conducive to the development of individuality.  
In chapter 3, “The Demands of Identity,” Appiah more precisely defines 
the notion of a social identity, and then asks whether social identities are pre-
conditions for autonomy or threats to it, and whether the liberal state should 
take the social identities of its citizens into account in legislation and judicial de-
cisions. He stipulates the following conditions for L’s being a social identity: 
i. There are terms available in public discourse for picking out Ls; 
that is, there is some public consensus on who is and who is not 
an L (e.g., a Jew, an African-American, a professional philoso-
pher); 
ii. There is some internalization of the L identity by at least some 
Ls, so that e.g., they act as Ls, take an interest in the sorts of 
things Ls take an interest in, express solidarity with other Ls; and 
iii. There is at least some general social response pattern to Ls, such 
that non-Ls can be said to react to the L-ness of others in a so-
cially predictable way; some of these social responses may be 
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discriminatory, in which case the L identity itself may be opposi-
tional and involve narratives of resistance.  
Historically, liberalism has been associated with the struggle for treating 
citizens without regard for their social identities, e.g., to treat Jews, or African 
Americans, or women, as equals, without regard to their ethnic, racial, or gender 
identities. But recently, multiculturalists have turned this around, arguing that 
because individuality requires a background of social identity, and because indi-
vidual Ls cannot flourish if Ls as a group are socially devalued, the state must not 
ignore, but rather must explicitly recognize and respect the identities of citizens.  
In considering these claims, Appiah divides multiculturalists into two 
camps, which he labels “hard” and “soft” pluralists. Hard pluralists such as 
Horace Kallen want to conceive multi-cultural nation states as federations of 
identity groups, and wish the liberal state to promote and protect not only indi-
vidual but also group flourishing. Indeed, the two are interconnected because, as 
hard pluralists insist, individual Ls can flourish only if the L group flourishes 
(think, for example, of the burden placed on each African-American by the so-
cial devaluation of African-Americans as a group.)  
Appiah notes that on the surface, hard pluralism conflicts with liberal in-
dividualism. When positive recognition of an identity is demanded, the identity 
tends to freeze; the very apparatus of recognition leads to the ossification of the 
identity. There will, however, be individual Ls who will dissent from, or reject, 
the L scripts prescribed by the group representatives who interact with the state 
in efforts to promote and preserve the group. Others will simply wish to exit 
from the group, for example Jews who choose to convert. Either of these choices 
would weaken the group, and the liberal state, even in the name of group recog-
nition, cannot be placed in the position of working against them.  
There is a deeper problem, in that there is no obvious way to determine 
the appropriate boundaries of the various groups in the national federation of 
identity groups. How about the group of dissenting Catholics who practice birth 
control and favor priesthood for women? Clearly there are many of these, and 
they have their own organizations and communication vehicles, and member-
ship in this group also provides a basis for meaning and solidarity. Should the 
state promote and protect their identities too? To do so would obviously under-
mine the state’s promotion and protection of Catholic identity, and negate the 
entire hard pluralist program.  
Further, some identity groups are themselves internally illiberal, in that 
they practice discrimination against a sub-group of members, for example 
against women. The restrictions on women with regard to professional choices 
in certain forms of Islam, for example, make it impossible for them to make life 
plans that suit their individual temperaments and talents. Liberal individualism 
cannot recognize and value such restrictions. 
Such considerations have weighed in favor of one or another version of 
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“soft” pluralism. Will Kymlicka, for example, has argued that the state should 
both recognize and protect certain identity groups, but also demand that such 
groups abandon illiberal practices. Critics of soft pluralism, however, have re-
sponded that this is not sufficiently pluralistic because requiring groups to aban-
don some of their core practices is not to recognize, but rather to annihilate 
them. After assessing these concerns, Appiah counters that the multiculturalists’ 
concern for the protection and survival of identity groups is misplaced; they 
should instead concern themselves with equal citizenship for group members. 
This requires only equal respect from the state for individual citizens regardless 
of their identity groups, not group recognition.  
In chapter 4, “The Problem with Culture,” Appiah notes that much of the 
discussion of social identity has been centered about the notion of culture. Indi-
viduals are seen as deriving their identity from their cultures, and cultures are the 
kind of group that struggles for recognition. The term “culture,” however has 
expanded beyond the root notion of an encompassing network of practices sup-
porting and sustaining the way of life of a territorial group. It has become ubiq-
uitous, applying to just about any network of group practices, so that we now 
speak of youth culture, deaf culture, and gay culture. Appiah complains that the 
term has been “atomized within an inch of its life,” making the discourse of cul-
ture a “singularly boggy terrain.” Has the notion of culture expanded to such an 
extent that has lost its all of its “conceptual purchase,” so that questions of iden-
tity should now be taken up in other terms? Appiah provides several arguments 
for concluding that it has.  
He first argues that if cultures are regarded as intrinsically valuable, as 
good in themselves, this would suggest that they be preserved, or frozen in ways 
that would constrain the life choices of their members in ways that, as we saw 
above, would violate the demands of liberal individualism. Here Appiah echoes 
Dewey’s observations that individual group members cannot borrow a culture, 
but have to make one (MW 10:297). The present is “life leaving the past behind” 
(MW 9:79–81); the vital task of culture is not to reproduce the past but to pro-
duce in the present the conditions for future vitality.  
Appiah then argues that programs of cultural destruction (e.g., requiring 
native American children to be taken from their parents and educated in resi-
dential schools) can readily be condemned on liberal grounds without reliance 
on a notion of culture, as abuses of state power and imposition of unequal status 
for members of certain groups.  
Similarly, cultures are sometimes defended as the necessary contexts for 
certain values. For example, some may feel that chastity has not been valued 
adequately since the passing of the Victorian culture, and they may wish to re-
store a “culture” of chastity. The problem here is that there has been a slippage 
from “culture writ large” to “culture writ small.” Certainly the advocates of chas-
tity do not wish to restore Victorian culture in its entirety, nor could they, nor 
are they likely to think that only that specific culture in all its detail could value 
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chastity. Thus, all the talk about culture is entirely superfluous; what they value 
is not culture but chastity.  
A deeper concern is that projects of preserving and protecting cultures 
never arise in a political or economic vacuum. Projects defended in terms of cul-
tural preservation often require change rather than preservation. The project of 
“preserving Quebec culture” by eliminating street signs or school instruction in 
English, for example, has been more about constructing a new Quebec identity 
than preserving anything that existed in the past. Here, appeals to “culture” are 
simply misleading cover-ups for forward looking political projects.  
Ironically, some ways of granting recognition to cultures erodes or de-
stroys rather than protects and preserves them. Consider groups who have suf-
fered discrimination and whose identities have been sustained through cultural 
narratives of opposition. To turn around and positively value their cultures is to 
give the received cultures the kiss of death. African Americans become more like 
Whites, not less, when their “culture” is positively recognized and valued, be-
cause in that event the oppositional narratives and behavioral patterns that have 
evolved as central to their culture are undermined. Instead of worrying about 
their culture, we might be better off simply treating African Americans with 
equal respect, and letting their culture evolve however it might.  
Finally Appiah considers whether we retain the language of culture not be-
cause we value culture, but because we value cultural diversity. He notes that Mill 
placed great value on the diversity of ways of life that could flourish within soci-
ety, but he did so because different ways of life provided contexts in which indi-
viduals with different temperaments might flourish. Individuality, not cultural 
diversity, was the primary value. He wouldn’t have valued despotic ways of life, 
or those based on slavery, as adding to diversity. Instead, he would have set limits 
to diversity based on principles of individual self development and respect for 
basic human rights. “Moral modernity” has rested on the expansion of these 
principles, for example, their extension to women and minorities. As a result, 
Appiah argues, no argument for cultural diversity that cuts against these princi-
ples is likely to be convincing. So in this case, the talk of cultural diversity adds 
nothing of value that is not already included in liberal individualism.  
In chapter 5, “Soulmaking,” Appiah asks what the role of the liberal state 
might be in attempting not merely to make citizens’ lives go better, but to make 
them go better by making the citizens better people (hence the term “soulmak-
ing”). Issues of identity enter into this project when we ask in particular about 
whether, and how, the liberal state should intervene in the process of identity 
formation with the intent of increasing the chances of citizens with the resulting 
identities living ethically successful lives. Such lives, Appiah stipulates, are those 
in which a person both achieves what he or she sets out to achieve in accordance 
with a plan of life, and experiences and creates things of significant value. For ex-
ample, a person who set out to become, actually became, a lawyer, and along the 
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way had many rich experiences and won significant cases, could be said to have 
lived an “ethically successful life.” 
Appiah is not out to defend or reject soulmaking, but merely to under-
stand the ways in which it might enter into the projects of the liberal state. He 
explores three ways in which the liberal state might get involved in soulmaking: 
making citizens more rational, fighting discrimination, and educating the young. 
His broad conclusion regarding all three cases is that state efforts to make citi-
zens better people, including efforts that affect the identity formation processes, 
are unavoidable, but must always be balanced against the need to respect the 
autonomy of citizens as they currently exist.  
With respect to the project of making people more rational, Appiah’s initial 
point is that there are ways for the state to assist us in improving our lives with-
out even trying to make us better people. The government may, for example, 
simply establish a computerized shopping system to flag and remove items at the 
cash register that we have, in our current moral condition, signed up to do with-
out. Alcoholics could in this way be assisted in staying on the wagon, even with-
out treatment that would make them better. 
It might be argued that the state’s provision of information, through sub-
sidies for libraries, might also improve our lives, merely by making us more effi-
cient in satisfying our already existing desires, or merely qualifying them in light 
of new information, rather than by making us better people. The problem with 
this idea is that past a certain point, the “informed desires” no longer need to 
bear much relation to the previous unqualified desires. As Appiah puts it, the 
“informed desire” model moves in the direction of a third-person perspective, in 
which people are no longer assisted in satisfying their own desires but those se-
lected by a “God that loves them.” For example, you want to relax with a ciga-
rette, but after the government anti-smoking and nutritional information cam-
paigns have had their way with you, you drink green tea instead. Are these 
campaigns merely helping you to satisfy your own “informed desire” or are they 
intended to change your desires for the better?  
Even those liberal theorists who reject all forms of soul making might not 
complain about anti-smoking campaigns or nutritional labeling laws. But the 
state can clearly go too far in its attempts to make us more rational. Appiah in-
vites us to consider life in “Cartesia,” where the state campaigns not only against 
smoking, but against all forms of irrationality including astrology and even su-
pernatural religion. He argues that such a state could not sustain itself as a liberal 
democracy. It would violate citizen autonomy, undermine identities central to 
citizens’ understandings of themselves, constrain free association and freedom of 
speech, and simply irritate too many citizens.  
With respect to anti-discrimination policies, Appiah argues that the liberal 
state does, and should, intervene to reduce the social stereotypes that generate 
demeaning identities. It rightly passes laws prohibiting discrimination in public 
accommodations and employment. These laws result in modifications, over 
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time, in the identities of both disadvantaged minority group members and those 
previously engaged in discrimination. This constitutes soulmaking as defined, 
because the state improves the lives of its citizens in part by fostering better iden-
tities. These policies, however, must be balanced against protections of freedom 
of speech and free association in the private sphere 
With regard to the education of the young, the state is involved in the for-
mation of those who do not yet have stable identities, and it cannot help but af-
fect their identities. All liberal democratic approaches to education share at least 
two concerns, the preparation of the young for autonomy, and the preservation 
of the state as a self-perpetuating democracy. Appiah’s initial point is that the 
process of formation does not strictly entail that the state must get involved in 
intentionally shaping identities in particular ways. Nonetheless, philosophers of 
many ideological persuasions conceive of education as a “widening of horizons” 
beyond those of parochial homes, a project intended to support the formation of 
autonomy by broadening the range of elements from which a life plan can be 
constructed. This liberal project, however, conflicts with the commitments of 
those parents adopting certain (e.g., “fundamentalist”) identities that explicitly 
eschew wider horizons. While we could try to resolve these conflicts by democ-
ratic means, for example, by electing school board members granting them au-
thority to determine the curriculum, Appiah notes that other options may be 
both possible and more effective.  
One possible compromise would be to leave it to parents to teach their 
children what is true, while restricting the state to teaching what various groups 
in the community think to be true. The problem is that illiberal parents have fre-
quently rejected this sort of compromise, insisting that views in conflict with 
their own can only be taught, if at all, as dangerous error. Appiah doesn’t add, 
but might, that professional educators are no more likely than fundamentalist 
parents to accept this relativist limitation, as it would effectively undermine their 
professional identities as teachers. He does note, however, that school officials 
are usually reticent about acceding to identity claims at odds with the official 
curriculum. One example is the Mozart case, in which parents found stories in 
the district’s reading textbook offensive, and demanded that their children be ex-
cused from the English course. They offered to teach English at home and have 
their children take the district’s mandated reading test, but the district rejected 
the offer. Appiah thinks they may have been too hasty, as accepting the parents’ 
proposal could be defended on grounds of respecting their autonomy. On the 
other hand, he acknowledges that many claims grounded in intolerant identities 
must be rejected, and the schools, given their liberal democratic aims, must seek 
to modify identities some children acquire at home.  
In chapter 6, “Rooted Compopolitanism,” Appiah sets out to salvage a 
cosmopolitan ethic—an identification with all of humanity—in the face of re-
cent attacks. Some critics have argued that cosmopolitanism is incoherent, as the 
world, unlike the family or local community, is not a concrete site of positional 
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attachments; one simply cannot identify with “people” in the way one identifies 
with a brother or a home town. Others have argued that cosmopolitanism is tied 
to the enlightenment project of perfecting people, and can only be taken up from 
a position of privilege, i.e., of those doing the perfecting, a position that under-
writes colonialism as civilizing the heathens.  
Some forms of cosmopolitanism have, indeed, been hostile to less univer-
sal attachments. Virginia Woolf speaks of “freedom from unreal loyalties,” Tol-
stoy regards patriotism as fake and stupid, Martha Nussbaum considers our 
families of origin and places of birth “accidental.” Appiah quips that just about 
everything that gives our lives meaning is to a large extent “accidental” in the 
same sense, so he wishes to develop a version of cosmopolitanism that is friendly 
to various attachments and loyalties including national ones, a cosmopolitanism 
that values people as encumbered by identities. 
A first obstacle to this project lies in squaring associative obligations with 
the demand for moral impartiality. How, concretely, can a moral agent donate a 
kidney to his or her brother when there are so many other people who need it 
just as much if not more? Appiah creatively maintains that this question arises 
from a Rylean category mistake. Individuals are not, like states, bound by moral 
equality. The demand for impartiality is “position-dependent”; a store owner 
can with impunity arrange for his son to take over his position, but a public offi-
cial can not. The special obligations stemming from our attachments, as a result, 
do not in general conflict with moral obligations. Ethical obligations (donating a 
kidney for my brother) are born by “thick” selves in light of the lives they have 
made for themselves by way of associations and attachments. Moral obligations 
(refraining from violence), on the other hand, apply to all moral agents as a re-
sult of their “thin” relations. Moral obligations require compliance, while ethical 
obligations merely call for it. I can choose to be a good brother or not, in a way 
that I cannot choose whether or not to conform to moral rules. The former 
choice, but not the latter, is “up to me.”  
This argument secures the merely negative point that special obligations 
stemming from local attachments do not conflict with commitment to universal 
moral norms. This leaves open the question of whether particular attachments 
rejected by previous versions of cosmopolitanism, for example, loyalty to nation 
states, make sense. Appiah divides the task, noting that states have a moral claim 
upon us, not because we choose to care about them but because their coercive 
mechanisms open the space for our individual freedoms. Nations, on the other 
hand, matter to us ethically in much the same way as families and communities; 
they exist in our chosen projects through our shared exposure to their thick nar-
ratives. Being a good patriot is somewhat like being a good brother or neighbor; 
the choice is “up to us” and is an element in our overall plan of life.  
Given our “thin” attachment to particular states, would it make sense to 
retain our loyalty to our nations while opting for a global state to protect basic 
moral rights? Appiah answers that we have no reason to think that a global state 
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would do a better job of protecting individual rights than existing national po-
litical institutions. The cosmopolitan project Appiah identifies with does not aim 
at establishing not a transnational polity but a rich transnational conversation, in 
which even if we cannot find any rational basis for agreement, we may nonethe-
less reach practical agreement. Such a conversation lies at the heart of Dewey’s 
vision of expanding democracy, and is now taking place at many levels. Dewey’s 
cosmopolitan vision, however, also favored creation of a transnational polity 
with legislative and executive functions, to prevent war and to protect human 
rights (MW 5:422, 430). Given the dismal record of the current American ad-
ministration, making war in defiance of the Security Council and world opinion, 
violating the Geneva Convention, and undermining basic rights of its citizens 
through such measures as the eerily named “Patriot Act,” I would not be as 
quick as Appiah to dismiss the need for strong transnational political institu-
tions.  
♦ ♦ ♦ 
The Ethics of Identity is beautifully written. Appiah’s sentences are frequently 
epigrammatic. His conceptual analyses and arguments are generally clear and 
persuasive, and at times make use of fascinating thought experiments. His use of 
a broad range of literary examples to illustrate his points is remarkable for a con-
temporary philosopher.  
Some treatments of the large organizing topics are more successful than 
others. I found the discussions of identity and individuality (chapter 1), culture 
(chapter 4) and cosmopolitanism (chapter 6) consistently illuminating. The 
treatment of autonomy (chapter 2), however, was not entirely convincing. Even 
if anti-autonomists grant that retaining the vocabulary of rational and autono-
mous individuals might be useful in conceiving the polity as a space for individu-
ality, why would they not counter that employing the language of encumbered 
selves and social structure can be even more useful in identifying issues essential 
for sustaining individuality, while at the same time providing a more realistic 
picture of social life. The notion of balancing respect for the autonomy of actu-
ally existing (even illiberal) citizens against the state’s interest in tolerance and 
excellence of character (chapter five) struck me as insufficiently theorized, leav-
ing readers without clear principles for considering actual conflicts.  
I have two additional grumbles. First, Appiah’s selection of texts for dis-
cussion has an oddly presentist bias. He leaves no contemporary social philoso-
pher behind. All the usual suspects—Richard Rorty, Tom Scanlon, Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Tom Nagel, Joseph Raz, Will Kymlicka, Michael Sandel, Charles Tay-
lor, Bhiku Parekh and others—receive detailed treatment. But there is no men-
tion of earlier philosophers such as A. I. Melden, who placed issues of personal 
attachment special obligations on the table, and quite shockingly, no mention of 
John Dewey, who so influentially addressed Appiah’s main topics.  
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Second, while I greatly admired Appiah’s detailed treatment of so many 
conceptual analyses and arguments, I sometimes found myself lost in the thicket, 
and would have appreciated a more clearly marked pathway to his main conclu-
sions. 
In spite of these reservations, I find Appiah’s overall conception of liberal-
ism very congenial. Like many older philosophers who staked their claims before 
the “era of identity,” I have been somewhat skeptical about many popular and 
scholarly claims made in the name of culture and diversity, some of which have 
appeared to be thoughtlessly relativistic, others self indulgently outlandish if not 
blatantly hostile. If Appiah succeeds in attenuating the force of such claims by 
undermining the theoretical conceptualizations and arguments supporting 
them, and integrating the valid claims of identity into liberal theory, he will have 
contributed very significantly to the reconstruction of liberalism. 
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